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Pilot Details

Age: 25 Weight: 165 Gender: Highest rating held at the time of the incident: Pilot experience level:

Gear Details

Wing Brand: Model: Lotse 28, AFNOR Performance (probably a DHV 2) Size: Paramotor Frame: Unknown with

Incident Details

January 1, 2006 Location of the incident: , Type of Incident:

This report is an actual account of a reserve toss. It occurred on Saturday February 8th, 2003. The time of the occurrence was approximately 12:00 PM. The following comments are a combined effort of two ground observers (Terry Alford, Bill Hocker), and David Sigier (the pilot that tossed the reserve). There were a total of 6 people including David who witnessed the account. Steve Boser was also present and witnessed the account.

Weather: Very Nice Day, Slightly overcast with high clouds. The clouds shadowed the sun and prevented the normal mid day intense heat. The air was slightly cool with the outside temperature approximately 65 degrees. Winds very light out of the southeast . Bill and I both estimated the velocity to be 4-6 MPH.

Pre-takeoff: Bill and I both observed David getting prepared for flight. He was doing the normal stuff (checking out the engine, fuel, harness. reserve etc.) He appeared to give his unit a good preflight. His Friends (Dave Perry and Derk Lewis ) were also involved with the setup and preflight as helpers. The wing was placed on the ground and David did a final harness check. I watched him carefully as I knew that he was going to practice maneuvers that he planned for the convention. I watched as if I knew a problem could happen and I wanted his final harness/reserve check to be correct and complete. His reserve is attached in front with the risers going directly to the carabiners. In other words the risers are not routed around his shoulder and behind him as the “paragliders” do. I looked him over but didn’t say anything. He had looked himself over very well. David’s reserve is a Sup Air Medium (PDA) Pull down Apex.

Takeoff: His Takeoff was excellent. Bill and I both commented along with Steve Boser that his wing looked very high performance. The aspect ratio appeared very small. David comments in his report to me that his wing is a Lotse 28. It is rated as a Performance wing through AFNOR (probably a DHV 2 if not a 2-3). The Takeoff was normal and being the professional pilot that David is he did not do any radical turns or maneuvers close to the ground. He simply climbed out into the wind.

Climb out: As he climbed out he maneuvered his wing away from the field in which we were standing. I estimated that he had reached at least 1200 ft. Both Bill and I concurred that he was between 1200 and 1500 feet when he began his first series of maneuvers. Bill reports that he estimated that he was between 1000 and 1200 feet for his first series of maneuvers. David reports that he began his first series at 1500. I report this (altitude) detail because I want the readers to understand that the observers and the pilot are very close to the accurate altitude. Later as the maneuvers unfold David is too busy to report exact altitude and the observers such as myself, Bill and Steve have to estimate the position of the pilot as he performs the maneuvers and subsequently throws the reserve. The altitudes that are reported are relatively accurate.

First Series: David stated that he wanted to begin with a few simple procedures to warm up. He began his first series of Maneuvers with a SPIRAL DIVE then he did what appears to be a Wing Over, but in actuality it was an attempt at a loop. He reports that he initiated the spiral dive then inverted to go into a loop but didn’t have the inertia to make it over the top, therefore looking from the ground like a wingover. However, David reports that because of the momentum of the turn initiated by the spiral dive it may have appeared to have a twist before he purposely initiated a stall then recovered for the subsequent climb. I understand that from David’s report that he had planned to do the spiral dive followed by the loop exiting the loop with a stall. It took about 3-5 seconds for David to recover the induced stall. The recovery was accomplished by a minimum of 800 feet (my estimate) up to 950 feet. David did not do any additional maneuvers and decided to climb higher for his second set. The time between maneuvers was very short and it induced an element of uncertainty to the ground observers. Bill Hocker’s eagle eyes were trained on David and he verbalized out loud what we thought was the immediate occurrence of the riser twist and the efforts of David as he unfolded himself from the risers. David reports that this was an inaccurate observation and that he was simply moving swiftly between maneuvers which was certainly the case.

Second Set: As David reports , he climbed up to 1700 feet for the second set. On the ground Bill, Steve and I commented that he was higher than the previous set. My estimate was between 1700 and 1900 feet. He climbed up into the wind, reduced the power for several seconds and began with a SAT to the left. It was beautifully executed. He made about 4-5 full turns. It appeared with this wing that he lost altitude a little faster and the rotation was a little faster. He exited into a SPIRAL DIVE then pulled hard right brake to enter a LOOP. He reports that he did this to gain the momentum to do the LOOP. The glider didn’t look quite right when David got to the top the loop. I can’t describe how the wing looked, but it wasn’t completely pressurized. It is my understanding that once you begin a LOOP you don’t quit half way through. You must have the proper momentum and stay in the maneuver until you are over the top. Otherwise you could fall into the glider. David reported that he pulled too hard with an extra wrap on the right brake so as to make sure to get over the top. As he approached the TOP OF THE LOOP and his momentum slowed down the wing went into a spin (under him). There were at least 3 or 4 turns that occurred generating a serious riser twist. After David arrived ( via gravity) back under the wing he was faced with approximately 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 riser twist and the inability to control the wing surges and stalls.

Let me point out here that he had plenty momentum to do a perfect loop. Please dont assume that he fell straight down from the top. His momentum carried him all the way around, but as he was traveling past the top of the loop the wing went into a spin. Afterthought makes me believe that the Performance Wing that he was flying is very sensitive with very narrow parameters. He was facing the wing and basically going backwards ( when it was flying). Almost immediately he had about a 60% asymmetric collapse which caused him to have another riser twist. I estimate his altitude to be below 1000 feet but above 850 feet. Now David was faced with stalls and surges. The wing would stall and remain that way for about 2 seconds after complete collapse. The wing would then re-inflate and surge. David had gotten low enough that we could see him trying to unravel himself from the riser twist. After the second stall , re-inflation and surge, David had reached an altitude of about 600feet. He reports that he looked at his altimeter and remembered 600 feet. The wing stalled again. We could see David a little closer now and he stopped trying get the riser twist corrected and very briefly looked down. At this point he had made his decision to throw his reserve. He had no more options. In his own statement to me he says, ” I didn’t really have any other option than using my reserve.” He had reached an altitude below 500 feet but above 400 feet.

The Reserve Throw: As a ground observer all I could see was the reserve go out approximately parallel to the ground. It didn’t go very far. David said that he made a very poor throw. He pulled the reserve handle and tossed it all in one motion. In retrospect he stated that he should have “swing it more then throw it.”

The suspension lines draped down below the canopy. The main wing was still very erratic and complicated the reserve throw. The reserve canopy did not have a clear path or clear sky in that the main wings lines interfered with the reserve canopy as David descended and the reserve ascended. The process fluctuated between fast and slow motion. When the main wing stalled the sequence was fast and when the wing gave David support the sequence was slow and again erratic. The wing would again surge and accelerate causing David’s vertical velocity to increase. This was a tense time for everyone until the RESERVE was open. I estimate the altitude to be below 200 feet but above 100 feet. Bill’s estimation was between 200 and 250 feet. David stated that he though he was about 150 feet when the canopy opened. He also stated that after the toss he realized that it was a very poor throw and pulled on the suspension lines of the reserve to help the canopy open. One additional observation was that the reserve was slow to open due to a relatively slow vertical velocity. Also David was not spinning or turning which would have added centrifugal force in a linear direction to assist the reserve opening.

Under the Reserve: There was very little time in this configuration. Once the reserve opening, the main wing continued to be erratic. It would stall and surge, but certainly not a violent as it did when his entire body/motor weight was under the wing. The wing now turned several times further causing more riser twist. I estimated at least 2 more. My major concern was the possibility that the main wing would wrap itself around the reserve suspension lines and could possibly cause the reserve to collapse. Fortunately the main wing remained rather docile and although continued to inflate and surge did not appear to have the energy necessary to wrap the reserve. David stated that he tried to collapse the main but could not overcome the riser twist. He also stated that he knew he was close to the ground and prepared for the landing.

The touchdown: About 50 feet or less above the ground the wing surged forward and flapped around and David’s vertical velocity increased slightly. He was descending nearly vertically since the winds remained about 4-6 MPH. Very fortunately he was moving backwards. He raised his feet and hit the ground. He appeared to be in a turtle position upon impact. The contact was hard. It destroyed the cage which absorbed a great majority of the force of impact. The prop was not damaged nor was the engine, net or harness. The cage and side bars are destroyed and close examination reveals the direction of the force and the fact that the cage may be a safety feature in these kind of emergency procedures. David may have done less damage if he had attempted some form of PLF and absorbed some of the force with his legs. His descent was in my estimation equivalent to a paratrooper under a 28 foot flat circular canopy. Fast but not life threatening. I will comment however that without the reserve a life threatening situation certainly existed. After touch down. David was out of his harness almost immediately. Dave Perry counted the number of riser twist and found 6 full twist. The wing was examined for damage. There was no damage but some abrasion to the line sheaths(9)were found. The reserve was intact, also without damage. I took the reserve home with me for a complete inspection and repack. Other than a hard landing David did not have any injury. His helmet, harness, cage and reserve offered him excellent protection. However, most importantly David carried the reserve and had the forethought and awareness to use it. David and I both believe that a reserve can give you a sense of invincibility. If used incorrectly or in a situation where the reserve was not required could cause a serious problem. However, carrying the reserve and having it when it is needed is far better that not having it when you have no other choices.

Lessons Learned:

• Always fly with a reserve.
• Expect the unexpected.
• Be prepared to use your emergency equipment.
• If you haven’t had a reserve clinic — TAKE ONE.
• Maintain lots of altitude, especially when doing maneuvers.
• If you don’t maintain altitude- understand the risk increase.
• Riser twist can be deadly and unpredictable. Know how to react to them and what to expect.
• Practice PLF’s.
• Mentally prepare yourself for the eventuality of using the reserve. Start with a good preflight and think through your flight. Complacency kills.
• Think about other safety equipment that could have saved other lives. Floatation Equipment, Hook Knives, Helmet, Radio’s Etc.
• THINK SAFE and above all don’t develop a hazardous attitude.
• It can happen to you. You dont have to be doing maneuvers to experience a 60% collapse followed by a severe riser twist at a low altitude, or a midair collision, or equipment failure that would require you to deploy a reserve.
• ATTITUDE IS EVERYTHING.
• Take a Maneuvers Clinic so that you can recognize a problem and deal with it correctly. The above (lessons learned) are the sole opinion of Terry Alford and may or may not reflect the opinions of David Sigier or the ground observers that witnessed the reserve deployment reported above.

Ed: Obviously aerobatics is extremely risky and should only be undertaken after thorough training and with great appreciation for the extreme dangers involved.

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